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Introduction
In June 2002, after two years during which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reached new heights of violence, and after carrying out various military operations that did not provide a sufficient answer to the immediate
need to stop the murderous terrorist acts, the Israeli government adopted a
military recommendation to erect a security fence that was supposed to
prevent terrorist infiltration from the Palestinian territories into Israel. The
chosen route of the fence involved various limitations on the rights of the
local Palestinian inhabitants. Inter alia, private land was seized from its
owners, peasants were separated from their agricultural lands and needed
special permits in order to go from their homes to their fields, and access
roads to urban centers were blocked off, hence preventing access to medical and other essential services.
A petition against the legality of the chosen route was filed to the
Israeli Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.' On June 30,
2004, the court unanimously held that while the decision to erect a separation barrier, along any possible route, cannot be motivated by a political
desire to create a de facto annexation of territories to the state of Israel, the
Israeli government was motivated only by valid security concerns. Nevertheless, the court determined that some parts of the route of the fence were
illegal because they injured humanitarian rights of the local inhabitants to
the extent that there is no proper proportion between this injury and the
security benefit of the fence.

f Professor, Faculty of Law, Haifa University; Former Military Judge in the Israel
Defense Forces, holding the rank of colonel. Thanks are due to my research assistant
Ms. Tchia Shachar, whose dedicated work enabled this essay.
1. Beit Surik Village Council et al. v. Government of Israel et al., HCJ 2056/04
Uune 30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 1099 (2004) (hereinafter Beit Surik judgment].
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Nine days after the Supreme Court's ruling, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) rendered an advisory opinion on the matter, on the request of
the General Assembly of the United Nations.2 In contrast to the fundamental conclusion of the Supreme Court, the ICJ found by a majority of fourteen judges to one, that the fence should not be regarded as a temporary
security measure whose sole purpose was to enable Israel to effectively
combat terrorist attacks, but rather as a political attempt to draw new permanent borders of Israel by creating facts on the ground that would be
tantamount to de facto annexation. Thus, the ICJ determined that the construction of the fence was contrary to international law, and therefore
Israel was under an obligation to cease its construction and dismantle it
forthwith.
A year has passed since both decisions were rendered, and it seems
that the questions presented before the two tribunals have remained as
urgent as before: How can a democratic nation defend its citizens from
external violent threats? What is the proper normative balance between
security needs and humanitarian considerations? Which international
norms apply to armed conflicts between a sovereign state and terrorist
organizations?
The two tribunals, who prima facie guided themselves by similar legal
norms, reached different conclusions in each of these questions. In my
opinion, the difference originated from inadequate implementation of the
legal norms by the ICJ, which was caused by a combination of insufficient
evidentiary bases and improper balance between the competing values. In
this essay, I shall address these defects at length.
I.

Some Preliminary Comments on Terminology

The law, like human beings, does not operate in a vacuum. In democratic regimes, it is formulated by the legislative branch and interpreted by
the judicial authority. While the legislature sets the general legal norm
that is designed to regulate a type of situations, the judicial authority
implements it on the specific circumstances before it. For this reason, legal
judgments and opinions inherently reflect a variety of political theories
and, to a greater or lesser extent, the ideology of the individuals who wrote
them. It is therefore important to be aware of two significant terminological differences between the Supreme Court's judgment and the ICJ opinion: First, while the Supreme Court referred to the separation barrier as a
"separation fence," a "security fence," or a "Seamline" obstacle between
Israel and the areas of Judea and Samaria (the area), the ICJ adopted the
terminology employed by the General Assembly, and used the term "wall."
Although the ICJ was right in recognizing the fact that the structure in
question is a complex construction and therefore cannot be understood in
2. Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.CJ. 131 (July 9), 43 I.L.M. 1009 [hereinafter ICJ
Advisory Opinion], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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a limited physical sense, 3 I believe that it must have known that the use of
this particular loaded term, which was chosen by the General Assembly for
its obvious political meaning 4 , would most likely cause people-even if
they are unfamiliar with the issue-to feel a sense of aversion and antipathy
towards a structure of this kind because of the immediate negative connotations of the expression.
The second terminological difference between the Supreme Court's
judgment and the ICJ opinion concerns the manner in which each tribunal
chose to describe the violent events that led to Israel's decision to erect the
separation barrier.
It is an unfortunate but indisputable fact that for the past few decades,
Israel has been subject to incessant terrorist attacks, perpetrated by
extreme religious and nationalist Palestinian groups. Thus far, these brutal
attacks have resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians. Tens
of thousands of men and women have been injured. Coping with the constant fear of imminent terrorist attacks imprints its own indelible mark on
every aspect of daily life-political, cultural, social and economic. Indeed,
this is the unique destructive character of the terrorist act-its ability to
undermine the everyday life to a degree that5bears no relation to the direct
damage caused by the specific terrorist act.
This difficult reality was well reflected throughout the Supreme
Court's judgment. Inter alia, the court stated:
A short time after the failure of the Camp David talks, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict reached new heights of violence. In September 2000, the Palestinian
side began a campaign of terror against Israel and Israelis. Terror attacks
take place both in the area and in Israel. They are directed against citizens
and soldiers, men and women, elderly and infants, regular citizens and public figures. Terror attacks are carried out everywhere: in public transportation, in shopping centers and markets, in coffee houses and in restaurants.
Terror organizations use gunfire attacks, suicide attacks, mortar fire, Katyusha rocket fire, and car bombs. From September 2000 until the beginning
3. See ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 131, paras. 67, 82, reprinted in 43 I.L.M.
For a detailed description of the structure's components see the Beit Surik judgment, 43
I.L.M., para. 7:
In its center stands a "smart" fence. The purpose of the fence is to alert the
forces deployed along its length of any attempt at infiltration. On the fence's
external side lies an anti-vehicle obstacle, composed of a trench or another
means, intended to prevent vehicles from breaking through the fence by slamming up against it. There is an additional delaying fence. Near the fence a service road is paved. On the internal side of the electronic fence, there are a
number of roads: a dirt road (for the purpose of discovering the tracks of those
who pass the fence), a patrol road, and a road for armored vehicles, as well as an
additional fence. The average width of the obstacle, in its optimal form, is
50-70 meters.
4. See also David Kretzmer, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory: The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International HumanitarianLaw, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 88 n.3 (2005).
5. For a comprehensive analysis of the nature and characteristics of the terrorist act
see EMANUEL GROSS, THE STRUGGLE OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORISM: THE LEGAL AND

MORAL ASPECTS ch. 1 (Virginia University Press, forthcoming).
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of April 2004, more than 780 attacks were carried out within Israel. During
the same period, more than 8200 attacks were carried out in the area.
The armed conflict claimed (as of April 2004) the lives of 900 Israeli citizens
and residents. More than 6000 were injured, some with serious wounds that
have left them severely handicapped. The armed conflict has left many dead
and wounded on the Palestinian side as well. Bereavement and pain wash
6
over us.

In contrast, the ICJ majority opinion makes almost no mention of the
Palestinian terrorism. The court's most profound description of the situation simply states: "The fact remains that Israel has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its civilian population.' '7 The
narrative chosen mentions neither the nature of the acts (acts of terror) nor
8
the identity of the perpetrators (Palestinian terrorist organizations).
Here too, the ICJ's attempt to avoid addressing the unbearable consequences of the Palestinian terrorism on one hand, and its comprehensive
analysis of the limitations the fence imposes on the Palestinian population
on the other hand,9 necessarily create a sense of alienation and intolerance
towards Israel's justifications for the construction of the fence.
II.

The Security Fence as a Legitimate Measure of Nonforcible SelfDefense Against Terrorism Attacks

There is no dispute that a sovereign state is entitled to build separation
barriers on its international borders in order to prevent infiltration into its
territory. The state's ability to control its borders and prevent the
unchecked passage of people into its territory is considered to be one of the
primary symbols of sovereignty. Therefore, were the route of the separation fence to pass along Israel's side of the "Green Line" (i.e., the 1949
armistice line between Israel and Jordan after the War of Independence),
there would not be any doubts regarding Israel's right to build the barrier.
However, the fact that only some parts of the fence are situated inside
Israel, while others pass through the areas of Judea and Samaria, rises the
question whether the military commander in Judea and Samaria is legally
authorized to construct a separation fence in the areas under his control.
The ICJ-in contrast to the Supreme Court-reached the conclusion
that this was not a question whose answer is to be found in the law of selfdefense, but rather a question that related to the realization of political
sovereignty on an occupied territory held by a state. It rejected Israel's
contention that the fence was a temporary measure aimed at preventing
infiltration of Palestinian terrorists into Israel and determined that the
fence might prejudge the future permanent border between Israel and the
Palestinians and was hence tantamount to de facto annexation of occupied
6. Beit Surik judgment, 43 l.L.M., para. 1.
7. ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 131, para. 141, reprinted in 43 1.L.M.
8. The dissenting opinion ofJudge Thomas Buergenthal explicitly emphasizes these
two elements. See ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 131, reprinted in 43 I.L.M. at 1078
(Declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
9. See infra Part III.
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territories in the West Bank. 10 In other words, the ICJ assumed that
Israel's decision to build some parts of the fence on the occupied territories was meant to provide a political solution to its security need to determine the border separating it from the West Bank according to the 1949
armistice line. The court then observed that as an occupying power, Israel
was prohibited from acting in any way that might alter the status of the
territories under its control, and thus the construction of the barrier in the
occupied territories of the West Bank was contrary to international law.
This conclusion reflects, in my view, the most basic mistake of the ICJ
in this matter. True, Israel holds the West Bank-apart from certain areas
that were handed over to the Palestinians pursuant to the Israeli-Palestinian
Interim Agreement of September 1995-in belligerent occupation. The
area is subject to military administration headed by the military commander, who is responsible for ensuring the public order, the safety of his
soldiers, and the orderly life of the local population.
There is also no dispute that the military commander of territory held
in belligerent occupation is not permitted to perform any action, including
the construction of a barrier, in the area under his control for reasons other
than military. Israel-by its definition as an occupier-is only the temporary holder of the area. Thus, under no circumstances, should the military
commander take the national interests of his country into account. He
may only consider the security needs of his country against the humanitarian needs of the local population.
Therefore, if Israel's considerations in choosing the route of the fence
had been motivated by a political desire to establish its permanent national
border in the West Bank, the court would have indeed been right in its
conclusion. However, I am of the opinion that the factual basis presented
to the court supported the opposite conclusion. 1 ' First, the premise that
guided the ICJ in reaching its conclusion was that a security-based barrier
had to follow the "Green Line," otherwise it should necessarily be considered as a political-based barrier. This premise ought to be rejected, as the
Supreme Court eloquently explained:
10. ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 131, paras. 121-22, reprinted in 43 I.L.M.
11. It should be mentioned that the Israeli government decided not to take part in
the proceedings before the ICJ. Therefore, it limited its written statement only to issues
of jurisdiction and did not send representatives to state its case in the public hearings
held before the court.
Israel's decision not to participate in the said proceedings was a product of deep
resentment towards the U.N. institutions, which has evolved over the years, on the
ground that the U.N. is biased against the state of Israel.
In my opinion, the decision not to appear before the Court was wrong. It is indeed
possible that even had Israel participated in the proceedings, the court would not have
reached different conclusions. However, there is also a strong possibility that had the
Israeli perspective been presented, the Court's reasoning would have been more
favorable to Israel.
Nevertheless, the ICJ is a judicial body, and as such, it should have declined to render
the advisory opinion, or at least qualified its findings, due to the fact that Israel's
absence had left the court with no sufficient factual base. See also ICJ Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.CJ. 131, reprinted in 43 I.L.M. at 1078 (Declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
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The opposite is the case: it is the security perspective-and not the political
one-which must examine the route on its
security merits alone, without
12
regard for the location of the 'Green Line.'
Second, the fact that the fence is not a conventional buffer zone but
rather a complex construction with an array of security facilities 1 3 also
indicates its nonpolitical nature, since national borders are usually
designed to include fewer security devices.
Furthermore, although, as explained in the previous part, the ICJ
majority opinion employed terminology that intentionally blurred the
nature of the violent acts committed against Israeli civilians and the identity of the perpetrators, both elements were in the knowledge of the court.
This was the background for the repeated statements made by Israeli officials that the fence was a temporary measure aimed at physically blocking
the possibility of infiltration from the West Bank into Israel and had no
political significance of any kind. As mentioned above, the ability of a
nation to prevent the uncontrolled passage of people into its territory is a
prominent aspect of sovereignty; however, it is not a political aspect but a
security one. Thus, the central question-which the ICJ failed to recognize-was whether Israel had the right to defend itself against terrorist
attacks perpetrated by Palestinian terrorist organizations, and if it had,
whether it could realize the right to self-defense by building a security
barrier.
The answer to this question lies in the principle of self-defense and its
applicability to the unique situation of a violent dispute between a sovereign state and nonstate private terrorist organizations.
Both treaty and customary international law recognize the state's right
to use the appropriate measures, including force, in order to thwart the
dangers posed to its existence and to the security of its citizens. 14 Selfdefense in customary international law is based on the "Caroline Doctrine," which established the state's right to use force in order to defend
itself against real and imminent threats that require immediate response in
circumstances where all peaceful means of resolving the dispute have been
exhausted and the response is essential and proportional to the threat.
Self-defense in international treaty law is entrenched in Article 51 of the
UN Charter, which does not create a new right to self-defense, but refers to
5
the preexisting customary right.'
Nonetheless, the right entrenched in the Charter is not identical to the
12. Beit Surik judgment, 43 I.L.M. at para. 30.
13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. For an extensive analysis of the right to self-defense in treaty and customary
international law see Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (2001).
15. Article 51 of the UN Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security .
U.N. CHARTER
art. 51.
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customary law right.1 6 This can be seen inter alia from the fact that customary law permits self-defense in every case of aggression,whereas treaty
law permits self-defense only in cases of armed attack.17 Thus, terrorist
attacks by nonstate groups can qualify as acts of aggression, but there is a
difficulty in classifying them as an armed attack. Terrorist attacks are not
an armed attack in the classic sense because the attacks are not directed
against government and military targets but at civilian targets; the attacks
are not prolonged but are intermittent; and there are no defined battle
zones, although every civilian site is a legitimate target in the eyes of the
terrorists.
For this reason, the ICJ found that because the Palestinian terrorist
organizations are operating out of the West Bank, which is not an independent state but an occupied territory held by Israel in belligerent occupation, Article 51 of the Charter had no relevance in this case.1 8 The Court's
opinion seems to suggest that Article 51 of the Charter only recognizes the
existence of the right to self-defense in the case of an armed attack by one
state against another state. When an attack is committed by a nonstate
organization, and all the more so when this organization is operating out of
a territory held by the attacked state in belligerent occupation, the right to
self-defense does not apply.
In my view, the Court's opinion gives an inadequate interpretation to
the laws of belligerent occupation. The terrorist act contains some of the
principle characteristics of the traditional armed conflict: In most cases the
attacks are not spontaneous but are meticulously planned, sometimes after
intelligence has been gathered, since they have great impact and can cause
serious physical harm and property damage. In addition, the group possesses an organized armed force, and a hierarchical structure with a political branch that directs the activities of the operational branch. Under these
circumstances, in my view, it may legitimately be argued that terrorist
attacks amount to armed attacks and vest the attacked state with the right
to defend itself. 19
This is true whether the threat originates within or outside the occu-

16. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,
Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986 LCJ. 14, 94.
17. EMANUEL GRoss, supra note 5, at ch. 2.
18. ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.Cj. 131, paras. 138-39, reprinted in 43 I.L.M. It
should be noted that in her separate opinion, Judge Rosalyn Higgins expressed reservations about the Court's findings in this matter. See 2004 I.CJ. 131, paras. 33-34,
reprinted in 43 I.L.M. at 1058 (Higgins, J., separate opinion).
19. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center
in New York, the Pentagon in Washington and in Pennsylvania, the Security Council
decided to reconfirm the right to self-defense recognized in the Charter. This impliedly
confirms the thesis that terrorist attacks may be regarded as armed attacks that vest the
right to self-defense. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001) (regarding threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts).
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pied territory. 20 As explained, the international laws of belligerent occupation, which determine the obligations and rights of the occupying power,
are based on the premise that belligerent occupation is inherently temporary. Therefore, even though the occupier exercises effective control of the
territory, it cannot become the sovereign power over it by reason of its belligerent occupation. Yet, for as long as the belligerent occupation continues, the occupier has a right to defend itself and its civilian citizens against
terrorist attacks that emanate from the occupied territory.
A second relevant difference between the customary right to selfdefense and the treaty right to self-defense concerns the possibility of
engaging in preemptive activities directed at preventing anticipated attacks.
Customary law, which recognizes the right of the state to defend itself in
every case of aggression, provides that the right to self-defense embraces
the right to adopt defensive tactics in the face of an anticipated act of
21
aggression.
The question whether the right to anticipatory self-defense also exists
under treaty law has not yet been determined. On one hand, there are
those who argue that the language of Article 51 ("the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs") is unambiguous-that it is clear that a state is prohibited from employing armed force
as an anticipatory measure and that it must wait for an actual armed
attack.2 2 Opposing them are those who contend that the language of the
Charter is not so unequivocal, since it does not purport to create a new
right to self-defense but refers to the inherent rights of states to defend
themselves, and as mentioned, the customary law pointed at by the Charter
recognizes the right of states to anticipatory self-defense. A further argument is that in light of the fact that military capabilities have changed in
recent years, Article 51 of the Charter should be interpreted to comply with
the new world reality. Thus, for example, it would clearly be absurd to
assert that international law requires a state to absorb a severe nuclear
attack before it is permitted to defend itself.
In my opinion, in view of the modern means of warfare available to
nonstate terrorist organizations, Article 51 must be interpreted in the light
of its contents and purpose, so as also to enable self-defense in the face of
23
future terrorist attacks.
20. For a similar opinion see Ruth Wedgwood, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory: The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the
Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 52, 58-59 (2005).
21. YORAm DINSTEIN, THE LAWS OF WAR 68-70 (1983) (Heb.).

22.

YoRAm DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE

166 (3d ed. 2001).

23. It would seem that this is also the understanding of the UN General Assembly,
as in a resolution concerning the definition of acts of aggression, it decided that the first
use of force in breach of the Charter would comprise prima facie evidence of aggression,
but that the Security Council is entitled to decide that in the light of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the act, it should not be perceived to be an act of aggression. In effect, this amounts to indirect recognition of the legality of the use of force as
anticipatory self-defense. See G.A. Res. 3314 U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at
142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (defining aggression).
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In any event, I believe that this controversy is of purely theoretical
importance, as the moment the malicious thoughts of the terrorist begin to
be put into practice by real steps preparatory to the commission of the
attack-such as planning or enlisting persons to perpetrate it-it may be
said that the terrorists have in fact begun to commit the attack, and therefore the state is indisputably vested with the right to defend itself against it.
At this point we should also consider the nature of the separation barrier. Because self-defense usually involves the use of force, the barrier is
not a conventional act of preemptive self-defense, in the sense that it is a
nonforcible measure. While the Supreme Court made no distinction
between forcible and nonforcible acts of self-defense, 24 the ICJ did not
examine this aspect in light of its preliminary conclusion that the construction of the barrier was based on political considerations and hence contrary to international law. Only Judge Higgins, who criticized the court's
analysis of the applicability of the law of self-defense to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, noted that she remained "unconvinced that non-forcible measures (such as the building of a wall) fall within self-defence under Article
'25
51 of the Charter as that provision is normally understood.
In my opinion, as the right to self-defense enables the state to use
forcible measures, a fortiori it enables it also to use nonforcible measures. 2 6 Indeed, from a legal point of view there is no difference between
the state's right to defend itself by active means, such as military air-strikes
or administrative detentions, and its right to defend itself by passive means,
such as the imposition of curfews and blockades or the construction of a
barrier. However, each type of measures has different ramifications: While
forcible measures endanger the lives or well-being of the terrorists and
sometimes of the innocent local inhabitants of the territory held in belligerent occupation, nonforcible measures primarily disturb the orderly life of
the local population. In this case, the chosen path of the separation barrier
not only injured the humanitarian rights of the local population, but it also
required the seizure of land privately owned by local inhabitants.
An act of self-defense is justified only if it is necessary and proportionate. 2 7 In other words, it must create a proper balance between the military
needs of the army and the humanitarian needs of the people who are
affected by it. Thus, the laws of belligerent occupation authorize the mili24. The Supreme Court relied on the premise that both forcible and nonforcible
measures may qualify as acts of self-defense. Thus, after concluding that the considerations for building the fence were military-based rather than political-based, the Court
immediately turned to examine the legality of the route chosen for construction of the
separation fence. See Beit Surik judgment, 43 I.L.M., para. 33.
25. See 2004 I.CJ. 131, paras. 33-34, reprinted in 43 I.L.M. at 1058 (Higgins, J.,
separate opinion).
26. See the statement of Israel's permanent representative to the United Nations:
"International law and Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1368 (2001)
and 1373 (2001), have clearly recognized the right of States to use force in self-defence
against terrorist attacks, and therefore surely recognize the right to use non-forcible measures to that end." G.A. Res. A/ES-10/PV.21, 21st Emergency Special Sess., Agenda Item

5 (2003).
27. Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986 I.CJ. at 103.
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tary commander to expropriate private land in areas under his control, if
an absolute military necessity exists. 28 This normative framework was
summed up by the Supreme Court as follows:
It is permitted, by the international law applicable to an area under belligerent occupation, to take possession of an individual's land in order to erect
the separation fence upon it, on the condition that this is necessitated by

military needs. To the extent that construction of the fence is a military
necessity, it is permitted, therefore, by international law. Indeed, the obstacle is intended to take the place of combat military operations, by physically

blocking terrorist infiltration into Israeli population centers. The building
of the obstacle, to the extent it is done out of military necessity, is within the
authority of the military commander. Of course, the route of the separation
fence must take the needs of the local population into account. That issue,
29

however, concerns the route of the fence and not the authority to erect it.

I shall therefore now turn to examine the question whether the chosen
route of the barrier created an adequate balance between the legitimate
security necessities of Israel and the humanitarian needs of the local
inhabitants.
III. National Security versus Humanitarian Considerations
Even when a democratic state is legally entitled to defend itself against
terrorist organizations, it does not have unlimited freedom of choice in
relation to the nature of the measures it may use in order to protect its
citizens. Consequently, even though a security-based barrier is, in itself, a
legitimate measure of self-defense, it cannot be constructed along any
desirable route. The jus in bello, i.e., the laws that regulate the manner in
which a war may lawfully be conducted and that are primarily found in the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, restrict
30
the state from making free use of all the effective means at its disposal.
The restrictions imposed upon the state are intended to guarantee that
the military commander will use his authority to ensure public order in the
areas under his control after properly balancing the security needs of his
country against the humanitarian needs and human rights of the local
population.
28. Regulations 23 & 46, Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (Oct. 18, 1907); Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva IV) art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
29. Beit Surik judgment, 43 I.L.M., para. 32.
30. In this connection the question arises whether the implementation of the right to
self-defense is subject to the restrictions of international law regarding the manner of
conducting hostilities or whether when the right to self-defense is implemented against
terrorist organizations, the provisions of the jus in bello do not apply. This issue is
beyond the scope of this essay since the ICJ and the Supreme Court reached their conclusions after examining the relevant provisions of the jus in bello. For a comprehensive
discussion concerning this complex issue see EMANUEL GROSS, supra note 5, at ch. 2.

2005

Combating Terrorism

Thus, for example, Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which
establishes the basic provision of international humanitarian law in wartime, states:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honor, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely
treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or
threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity. ... However, the
Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security3 1in
regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.
Article 23 of the Second and Fourth Hague Conventions of 1907 prohibits the destruction of enemy property unless such destruction be imper32
atively demanded by the necessities of war.
Article 54(2) and (3) of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions further prohibits attacking, destroying, or rendering useless
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population which are
not clearly used for the military purposes of the adverse party. 3 3 Article
57(1) demands that: "[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care
shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
34
objects. "
Indeed, it is especially in times of violent disputes-when the cannons
roar-that the state's duty to provide security to its citizens is in the most
severe clash with its obligation, as a belligerent occupier, to protect the
rights and well-being of the local inhabitants. Thus, for example, the
Supreme Court ruled that the military commander must ensure the ongoing functioning of medical services as well as other welfare services that
are essential to the existence of the local population even during times of
an actual combat. 35 The separation fence imposes substantial restrictions
on the Palestinian population. Inter alia, expropriation of private lands
violates the right to property. In addition, the fence severely impedes the
freedom of movement by blocking off access roads to urban facilities such
as health services, educational establishments, and holy places. The route
chosen separates peasants from their agricultural lands, thus substantially
restricting their freedom of occupation. Access to the lands depends upon
the possibility of crossing the gates separating between the two areas.
However, this is no easy task because the gates, which are few in number,
31. Geneva IV, supra note 28, at art. 27; 4 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST,
1949: COMMENTARY 199 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
32. Regulation 23, Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague I1)(July 29, 1899); Regulation 23, Annexed to the Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (Oct. 18,
1907).
33. Art. 54 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
(June 8, 1977), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
34. Id. at art. 57.
35. See, e.g., HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. The Minister of Defense, 56(3) P.D. 30; Physicians for Human Rights v. The Commander of I.D.F. Forces in Gaza Strip, HCJ 4764/04
58(5) P.D. 385. (Heb.).
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are not always open and security checks cause long lines resulting in many
hours of waiting.
The proper manner to resolve this clash of interests is by conducting a
just balance between the conflicting values. The military commander can
impose limitations on the freedom of the local inhabitants, provided that
these restrictions are proportionate. 3 6 A proportionate balance between
national security and the rights of the local inhabitants is determined by a
threefold test: 3 7 (A) The compatibility test: The infringing measure must
lead rationally to the achievement of the purpose of the infringement.
Here, we need to determine whether the injurious measure, i.e., the chosen
route of the separation fence, can rationally lead to the achievement of the
security goal of the construction of the fence. (B) The least harm test:
Among all the measures suitable for achieving the purpose, the selected
measure must be the one that causes the least harm to the right. Here, we
need to examine whether, among the various routes that would achieve the
objective of the separation fence, the chosen one is the least injurious. (C)
The proportionality test: There must be a reasonable relationship between
the benefit accruing from realizing the purpose and the damage caused to
the individual as a result of the violation of his constitutional right. Here,
the question is whether the chosen route injures the local inhabitants to the
extent that there is no proper proportion between this injury and the security benefit of the fence.
There is no doubt that the central consideration in determining the
proper balance is the national security consideration. The basic rights and
freedoms of the people who live in an area held in belligerent occupation
when violent threats against the state originate within that territory, are
more limited than those to which they are entitled when public order is
maintained. Human rights and humanitarian needs-however importantmust retreat before compelling security interests in times of warfare. At the
same time, a democratic nation may not ignore the needs of the local
inhabitants-either according to the humanitarian law or other international conventions. 38 Security interests, however pressing, are no justification for abandoning the state's responsibility for ensuring the well-being of
the local population.
Ergo it follows that every balance that is made between security and
freedom will necessarily impose certain limitations both on security and
on freedom. We approach the task of drawing the proper normative balance between the two conflicting values, knowing in advance that its outcome will not make it easier for us to contend with our enemies.
36.

THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAw IN ARMED CONFLICTS 220 (Dieter Fleck ed.,

1995).
37.

3 AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN LAW 536 (1994) (Heb.).

38. The ICJ was of the opinion that not only humanitarian law, but also several
other human rights conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are
applicable to a territory held in belligerent occupation. This determination is not free of
doubts; however, even if these conventions apply to an occupied territory during an
armed conflict, they too ought to be properly balanced against security needs.
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The President of the Supreme Court, Justice Aharon Barak, eloquently
described this tragic dilemma:
This is the fate of a democracy-it does not see all means as acceptable to it,
and not all methods employed by its enemies are open to it. Sometimes, a
democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and and recognition of
individual liberties constitute an important component of its understanding
strenghten its spirit and strength and
of security. At the end of the day, they
39
allow it to overcome its difficulties.
The Supreme Court understood the meaning of this delicate balance.
It held that the route chosen for the construction of the barrier could
achieve its stated objectives. Nevertheless, the Court observed that significant parts of the barrier were disproportionate because they injured the
fabric of life of the local inhabitants to the extent that there was no proper
proportion between this injury and the security benefit of the barrier. The
Court therefore ruled that the military commander would have to provide
alternative routes in these areas, which would attain the security objectives
of the separation fence in a way that would cause less injury to the local
40
inhabitants.
The Court realized that a proper balance between security and human
rights must take both interests into account. Therefore, it determined that
the chosen route was disproportionate in places where it was possible to
satisfy the central security considerations while establishing an alternative
route whose injury to the local inhabitants was substantially decreased. It
is true that such an alternative route will not provide an ideal solution to
Israel's security needs, but the compromise-so the Court ruled-is the
price of democracy, which must adhere to its fundamental commitment to
preserve human rights especially during times of crisis.
The ICJ, in contrast, implemented the constitutional balancing
formula between national security and humanitarian rights improperly. It
concluded that in the inevitable clash between these two interests, the
humanitarian aspect bears the greater weight. Thus, in light of the grave
39. Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 5100/
94, 53(4) P.D. 817, 845. (Heb.).
40. Beit Surik judgment, 43 I.L.M., paras. 49-81. In light of this ruling, it is important to consider Israel's recent response to a petition that has been filed against the
legality of one of the segments of the fence, which was built prior to the Beit Surik
judgment. Israel admitted that the segment in question was chosen not only because of
military necessities but also because of urban considertions of a nearby settlement. Nevertheless, Israel argued that while there is no doubt that such a consideration was invalid in light of the court's judgment, the barrier should stay in its current position due to
the tremendous costs of dismantling and readjusting it.
In my opinion, this argument must be rejected. Humanitarian needs may only be
infringed because of compelling security interests. Financial considerations cannot justify, under any circumstances, the perpetuation of the initial injustice caused to the local
population. Therefore, I believe that Israel will have to-either by choice or as a result of
a court order-change this segment of the fence in order to reach a more proportionate
solution. See Yuval Yoaz, The State in Court: Not Only Security ConsiderationsAffect the
Route of the Fence, HA'ARETZ, July 4, 2005, at A4.
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injury caused to the local population by the construction of the fence, the
Court found that the chosen route, in general, could not be justified by the
requirements of national security. 4 1 This sweeping conclusion was not
only factually unfounded (the ICJ, in contrast to the Supreme Court, did
not examine the proportionality of each segment of the route, but rather of
the barrier in general), but it was also based on the misguided premise that
in order for the barrier to be proportionate, humanitarian needs should be
given greater weight than security considerations.

Conclusion
Protection of the basic rights and freedoms of the individual in times
of crisis poses a serious and complex challenge to every democratic
regime. As I explained, a democratic state that holds a territory in belligerent occupation is entitled to protect the lives of its citizens. At the same
time, the state is also obligated to protect the local inhabitants against arbitrary and disproportional violations of their rights carried out under the
pretext of security needs. Finding the proper balance between these two
clashing interests is not an easy task, since limitations must necessarily be
imposed both on security and on freedom.
I am of the opinion that the Supreme Court reached the proper normative conclusions in these matters. It recognized the separation fence as a
legitimate measure of self-defense against terrorism attacks and conducted
a just balance between national security and humanitarian considerations.
The ICJ, in contrast, relied on an insufficient factual base and conducted
an improper balance between the competing values, hence erring on both
matters.
I shall conclude with the words of the President of the Supreme Court,
Justice Aharon Barak, which seem most reflective of the spirit of this essay:
There is no avoiding-in a democracy aspiring to freedom and security-a

balance between freedom and dignity on the one hand, and security on the
other. Human rights must not become a tool for denying security to the
public and the state. A balance is required-a sensitive and difficult balance-between the freedom 42and dignity of the individual, and national
security and public security.

41. ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 131, paras. 123-37, reprinted in 43 I.L.M.
42. Anonymous v. Minister of Defense, F.Cr.A. 7048/97, 54(1) P.D. 721, 741.
(Heb.).

